INTRODUCTION
An event is ''common p-belief'' if everyone believes it with probability at least p, everyone believes with probability at least p that everyone believes it with probability at least p, and so on ad infinitum. Monderer Ž . w x and Samet 1989 hereafter, MS provide a characterization of common p-belief which relates this iterati¨e definition to the following fixed-point definition:
1 An event is said to be p-evident if whenever it is true, everyone believes it with probability at least p. An event E is common p-belief at state if and only if is an element of some p-evident event F with the property that everyone believes E with probability at least p whenever F is true. Since common 1-belief is essentially equivalent to the usual notion of common knowledge, this result is a generalization of Aumann's classic result 2 giving a fixed point characterization of common knowledge. Common p-belief has been shown to be a natural notion of ''almost common knowledge'': for p sufficiently close to one, economic outcomes are similar to outcomes under common knowledge.
3 Unfortunately the MS result requires each information set of each individual to have positive probability and thus each individual to have at most a countable number of possible signals. These assumptions remove the indeterminacy of conditional probability at particular states and so make it possible to define a belief operator which specifies at which states a given event is believed with probability p. This simplifies both the technical analysis and the interpretation, but excludes important applications.
Ž . In an analysis of common 1-belief, Nielsen 1984 identified sets which differ only by zero measure sets. In this note, we follow this approach and Ž define belief operators on classes of equivalent events rather than on . events directly . We prove a straightforward analogue of the MS result using such belief operators. This approach has the attractive feature that all definitions and results are independent of any particular version of conditional probability: there is a unique representation of belief operators despite the multiplicity of conditional probabilities. However, we emphasize that an alternative interpretation of our results is that we are confirm-Ž . ing that it does not matter almost surely if a particular conditional probability is fixed.
The note is organized as follows. After introducing some measure theoretic properties in Section 2, we then define class based belief opera-Ž . tors in subsection 3.1 and use them to define and characterize common Ž . p -belief in subsection 3.2 ; this characterization includes an uncountable signals version of Monderer and Samet's theorem. In Section 4, we discuss the application of the approach to a simple example.
SETUP
Throughout the paper we will fix a set ⍀, a -field F F on ⍀, a w x probability measure P on ⍀, F F , a finite collection of individuals I I, with Ä 4 sub -fields representing the information of each individual i, F F . We
will identify events which differ only by zero probability events. We first summarize some measure theoretic facts, which are versions of standard Ž . results that can be found in, for instance, Halmos 1950 Sonsino, 1995 , and learning Monderer and Samet, 1995 . E ; F if E and F are equivalent. It is easy to show that the relation ; is an equivalence relation on F F. Let E denote the equivalent class of events that contains event E. Then E ; F if and only if E s F. Denote the set ofẽ quivalent classes by F F; that is, F F s F Fr; . We write E ; F if there are measurable sets EЈ g E, FЈ g F such that EЈ ; FЈ. It is readily verified that ; is a reflexive and transitive relatioñ on F F. Notice that the relation ; is not the class inclusion and that it depends on the measure P.
Binary relations on F F analogous to union and intersection are defined as follows:
It can be readily verified that E j F and E l F are equivalence classes, containing E j F and E l F, respectively. The relative complement is Ä 4 also defined analogously: E _ F s EЈ _ FЈ : EЈ g E, FЈ g F , which is an equivalence class, containing E _ F. The union and intersection of countably many classes are also well defined:
It is easy to show that D E resp. F E is an equivalence class,
To sum up, the relations l, j, and ns 1 n n s 1 n _ work exactly as their set theoretic counterparts as long as we are dealing with countable operations on F F and the choice of representative element in each class does not matter. 
A conditional probability function of event E g F F with respect to F F is an essentially F F -measurable function f such that
where 1 is the
indicator function of E. Since functions that are identical almost every-where have identical integrals, a conditional probability function is essentially unique in the sense that f is a conditional probability of E if and only if any f Ј that coincides with f almost everywhere is a conditional probability of E. Conditional probability is countably additive in the following sense:
Suppose for each n, f is a conditional probability function of E . Then n n the function Ý ϱ f is well defined and it is a conditional probability
The posterior probability of a class E with respect to F F i Ž Ž. . denoted by ⌸ E is the collection of all conditional probability functions i of all sets EЈ g E, with respect to F F . i To summarize the above discussion, we have:
Ž . ⌸ E if and only if any f Ј that coincides with f P-almost surely belongs to
Then from Fact 3, the following can be readily verified:
The following describes the class of events where the individual p-
The following proposition summarizes basic properties of the p-belief p operator B , which are completely analogous to the finite or the countable i Ž . case as studied by MS , except that we are now dealing with classes of events.
PROPOSITION 5. The following properties hold:
Ž . B1 By construction.
Ž .
B2 If E is F F -measurable, then there exists EЈ g E with EЈ g F F ;
i i Ž . thus 1 g ⌸ E and the result follows.
then 1 is a conditional probability of EЈ. Let f be a conditional
. Since g G p if and only if g EЈ and f G p, B4 holds.
A EЈlFЈ

Ž .
n B5 We can choose a decreasing sequence of measurable sets F g F n , and set
conditional probability functions of F n , F, respectively. Since F n is decreasing, applying fact 1 to E n s F n _ F nq 1 , we have that f n converges Ä Ž . 4 monotonically, almost surely to f. In particular, : f G p ;
Common p-Belief Operator
We now want to consider belief operators for many individuals and formulate the concept of common p-belief in this general framework.
Define the ''everyone believes'' operator by the rulẽ 
F F
Ä 4
Ž .˜p
Define ''common p-belief operator'' C by the rulẽ
Ž .
p Ž . Because C E is a countable intersection of classes, it must itself be a class. In this framework, it no longer makes sense to ask if an event or class of events is common p-belief at a particular state , unless the Ä 4 singleton set occurs with positive probability. We rather define when a class E is common p-belief at some other class F.˜p
This iterati¨e definition will be related to the following fixed-point characterization.˜p
The following result is thus an uncountable version of MS's result, which Ž . Ž . is in turn a generalization from 1-belief to p-belief of Aumann's 1976 characterization of common knowledge. 
THEOREM 9. The class E is common p-belief at
Ž .
So it is enough to show that F is p-evident. Let E 0 s E, and define
ks 1 By Lemma 6, E k , k s 1, 2, . . . , is a decreasing sequence of classes. Ä 4
ticular F is p-evident as desired. B 4. DISCUSSION
A Fixed Conditional Probability Approach
Ž . Nielsen 1984 gave a characterization of common 1-belief for uncountable state spaces using the class based approach which we pursue here. Ž . Ž Brandenburger and Dekel 1987 pursued the alternative approach for . common 1-belief of fixing a particular conditional probability, and continuing to analyze common 1-belief about e¨ents defined at states. We believe Ž . that while the former approach which we have pursued here is mathematically more elegant, it is often useful in applications to use a natural conditional probability. One interpretation of the results presented here is that as long as we interested in probability 1 statements, there is no loss of generality in fixing a conditional probability. We therefore conclude by briefly summarizing how to do so.
For each i, fix a regular conditional probability P :
Ž< . P E и g ⌸ E for all i and E g F F, and P и is a probability measure i i i w with probability one such regular conditional probabilities exist if ⍀ is a x separable metric space and F F is the Borel field . For these fixed P , define In the remainder of this note, we will informally present an example which illustrates the usefulness of using fixed conditional probabilities to characterize common p-belief.
The Noise Example
Ž . The following example was analyzed by Morris et al. 1993 . There are w . two individuals 1 and 2. Individual 1 observes a number x g 0, 1 and w . for some x g 0, 1 . By convention, we will identify any number with its w x w . w x < < decimal part, so that if ␣ ) ␤, ␣, ␤ s ␣, 1 j 0, ␤ and ␣ y ␤ s Ä Ž .4 min ␣ y ␤, 1 y ␣ y ␤ . We consider probability measures indexed by 1 w . ÄŽ . < < 4 g 0, : P is the uniform measure on the set x , x : x y x F ; 
½ 5
We will show that for any p ) , any event E in F F * is never common 2 p-belief for all sufficiently small ) 0. However, if s 0, such events are p-evident and thus common p-belief whenever they are true, for any p ) 0. We will show how the analysis of this paper can be used to make these claims precise and independent of the choice of conditional probability. 
ÄŽ
. 5Ž . Ž .5 4 EgF F*, with E ; x , x : x , x y x, x ) ␦ . Consider any p ) Ž . Ž Ž .Ž .. p Ž . where g , p, n s 1 q n y 1 2 p y 1 . Thus C E s л. Thus for 1 p Ž . any E g F F *, C E s л for all p ) , for sufficiently small.
2
Now consider the case where s 0, and thus probability is distributed uniformly on the diagonal. The ''natural'' conditional probability has individual i observing x assigning probability 1 to individual 2 observing Ž . The above analysis like that of Morris et al., 1993 fixed the conditional probabilities. But the analysis of this note shows that the choice of p Ž . conditional probability does not matter. So if s 0, we have C E s E Ž x for all p g 0, 1 and all classes E; but if is positive but sufficiently 1 p Ž . Ž x small, C E is the null class for all E g F F * and all p g , 1 .
2 This extreme sensitivity of common p-belief to noise is important in a Ž . number of applications; see, for example, Carlsson and van Damme 1993 . 
